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Attachment for [REDACTED]
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"Three Years of Communist China"

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Ladies and Gentlemen:

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The subject that has been assigned to me was, "The Three Years of

Communist China."

CPYRGHT

The way in which a government comes into power has a great deal to do with the way in which it stays in power, however different things may look on the surface. So it's worth-while taking a very quick look at the way in which the Chinese Communists did get to the position in which they are today. Mao Tse-tung, himself, has been very explicit on the subject. Immediately after achieving conquest of the mainland, he pointed out in a very famous passage that this would have been impossible if it had not been for the changes in the international situation--the defeat of Japan, for example, was absolutely vital and the weakening of the power of the European empires plus the assistance that he got from the Soviet Union. He was quite explicit about this and makes no bones about it. This vast change in the international situation, plus the assistance of the Soviet Union, was of course extremely important. At the same time, I think other things were important too on the domestic front. The communist movement is a military movement and it came to power through military force. That

point has to be made, not because I wish to underestimate the influence of ideas but because everyone usually speaks of the role of ideas and neglects the influence of military force. The communists do not rely upon military force, nor do they rely upon ideas—they rely upon both and they use them both together usually in a skillful manner.

The new kind of army that the communists developed in China was also of very vital importance. It was an army that was actually built into villages and to the lowest possible organizations of the people—an army that included guerrillas, who operated in a very definite territory, which included guerrilla units which were more mobile and could be moved around from province to province and units which corresponded to the regular army training. The Chinese have a great military history. They have been conquered in their long history only twice—once by the Mongols and once by the Manchus, that is completely conquered. They have a proud military history. They have produced some of the greatest military writings in the world and our present Marine Corps organization—its basic unit—is copied and based upon that of the Chinese guerrilla forces. To many people this has come as a great surprise because for many reasons which I will not go

into now, one of which is wishful thinking. Mao Tse-tung, however, cannot be understood unless you understand the great military traditions of China, not military traditions in the Bonapartist sense although those are included, but military traditions and military ways of behavior that go right down into the lowest forms of organization in society. Mao is a man who flatters himself as a military man, a man who thinks of himself as a strategist, as a tactician, as well as a great theorist in the arts of Marxism, Leninism and now Maoism.

This then is a movement which has been a combination of great traditions in Chinese development, of the typical movements towards dynastic change plus the weapons, the technical, ideological weapons given by the modern communist movement. He developed a new kind of party. I think if there was ever a turning point in the fortunes of the Kuomintang--the Nationalist Party, the party that is now on Formosa, the National Government--between the fortunes of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, that point came around about 1941-42 at a time when Mao Tse-tung began the re-indoctrination and the disciplining of his own party. I think that if the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, the conquest of China

was won in the lecture rooms of 1942-1943 in Communist China. When Mao, with his fattened and swollen party, went through it sifting it, weeding out the undesirables, re-indoctrinating those who needed it and imposing his own leadership on it in a highly successful fashion—this accomplishment meant that at the end of the war in 1945 he had at his control a large, well-indoctrinated, highly-trained, well-disciplined (and Mao Tse-tung's ideas on discipline are as rigid as those in any communist book) party which was ready to go. He had to have one. Of course many of us have to have things but we don't always take the trouble to get them. He had to have this party if he were going to succeed because he had to have men he could send over large areas, men he could trust, men who did not have to have explicit, detailed directions day in day out, men who would be out of radio communication or any kind of communication for weeks and weeks on end. These were the sort of men he had to have. Lin Biao, the well-known communist general, was sent to Moscow in 1939 with 400 men to be trained in military schools there. He came back with them and they formed the cadres which made possible the throwing together of a great communist army in Manchuria after the war. In other words, all the preparations were

made during the war, made I'm afraid very intelligently and very shrewdly, so that at the end of the war there would be a very large, disciplined party which understood what it had to do and was very well indoctrinated and loyal to Mao Tse-tung.

Apart from this we all know of the tactical measures taken by the Chinese Communists--the use of the agrarian situation. Now, we know that the Chinese Communists have used the agrarian situation not necessarily to improve the lot of the peasant but as a quick, a ready and the only method of securing immediate political support and a basis for military power. The appeal of course was not to communal ownership but to private property. It appealed to the instinct to own land and this was successful but this was not all that there was to it. The secret of the so-called land reforms by the communists does not lie in the distribution of land. It lies in the redistribution of classes within a village. Mao, in his famous report on Hunan in 1926-27, goes out of his way to say revolution is not a dinner party. It is not something--and here he marks the old Confucian classic--it is not something which can be done gently, politely, sincerely and so on. It is insurrection. He goes on to say something

which is even more important, and that is this, that it is necessary to have in the village a certain amount of bloodletting—there must be terror. In other words, the communists do not propose to go into a village and say: "Gentlemen, we don't like the way your land is redistributed, we are going to take this away from you and give it to you," and have no cooperation from the village. That of course would be political suicide. They compel the villages to do it themselves. They get the peasants to pitchfork the landlords; they get them to help hang the landlords; they get them as accomplices in the crime. This is the secret of land reform—as far as the communists are concerned. As far as the peasant is concerned he is getting some land.

This movement, then, came into power for many reasons and it is a very very complicated affair. And it has in it elements of accident. The communists go out of their way to rewrite history and it is well worth all the time they put into it because they rewrite it with a view to establishing a doctrine of infallibility; a doctrine that whatever happened was planned, whatever comes about was foreseen and that the communists own a crystal ball in Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism-Maoism which enables them to understand what men shall do and to get men to do what they wish them to do. This rewriting

of history tends to help in creating this fiction of infallibility and there are many people, even including the most bitter enemies of communism, who have accepted this infallibility hook, line and sinker, who look upon communists as people as people who always do the right thing at the right time in the right way and upon ourselves as hopeless and helpless victims of a superior shrewdness and cunning. This is of course is exactly what they want you to think. If I had time I could tell you the history of China in the last thirty years and show you the colossal, bloody mistakes that Stalin has made, who has paid for them, and what impact the events have had upon doctrine and doctrine upon events. I assure you that these gentlemen are even more human and stupid than we are because they begin with a very stupid idea.

Now, the getting into power was also made possible by the condition of the National Government at the end of the war. The revolution in China represented by the men who are now on Formosa, by Dr. Ku for example who has been with us this week, this revolution was a capitalist revolution. It is the only really new thing that had happened in Chinese society for many, many years. It was a special kind of capitalist revolution, however,

for which there is no parallel in western or eastern history because of the specific conditions of China. It was special in ways that were very important to events later on. To put the matter briefly, by the end of the war the middle class of China--the specific middle class--had had its power broken by the Japanese invasion and no longer pulled the weight in national affairs that it had in 1937. This combined with the fact that in those years from '37 to '45--in those eight years--a new generation had grown up sloppily educated in universities and schools that had been dispersed all over the country, without any knowledge of the West and with extremely little knowledge of China, a generation necessarily fed on propaganda and very little else (there were hardly books even that they could read). These two things: the collapse in the power of the middle class combined with the existence of this enormous intellectual proletariat of people who had not really had the education they should have made it possible for the communists to push politics into a black and white situation and point up the extremes--the middle had gone--and the capitalist revolution was destroyed as much by the Japanese as by anybody else. The Japanese are as responsible as anybody for the conditions in '45 that made possible the struggle for power. When they got into power the first task

of the communists was to consolidate that power, not to improve the lot of the people, not to turn their attention to any social reform as Mao Tse-tung has put it himself (and I would read it to you if I could find the quotation, which I cannot) the first task is to set up the party dictatorship (of the communist party)—which is, naturally, leading for their own benefit all other groups in the country—to eliminate, to put it very briefly, the counter elite, to eliminate all those who might possibly dislike the regime and have the capacity and ability to fight against it. This task they embarked upon immediately and, I would say, that there is every indication that this much has been done with a very large amount of success. The many who stayed behind—many Chinese intellectuals and leaders who stayed behind to see what the communists would look like or who were then tied to their hatred of the Kuomintang and particularly of Chiang Kai-shek and preferred anything rather than to go with him, many of these men have now either been shot or have taken the risk of escaping through Hongkong.

In Hongkong itself there are up to two million refugees, who include thousands of American-trained Chinese, and on Formosa itself excluding the military and the party bureaucrats there are also many men who refuse

to have any truck with communism whatsoever. But on the mainland, by their own description and by their own figures, the communists have eliminated very large numbers of people and they immediately went after those who could possibly lead rebellion against them. The first conclusion we draw from this is of course that any leadership of revolt on the mainland now would have to come from new leaders rather than from old. I think events in other parts of the world are showing that new leaders are possible and can be home grown and developed by communist apparatus itself.

The next task was to complete the land reform. According to all reports, that is now practically finished. It had gone furthest of course in the areas occupied by the communists—that is, in the north—and extended rapidly to the south. The completion of the land reform went along on the model established in the north, that is, the essential part of it was the change in the relationship between classes of people in the village rather than in the land itself and, although opposition was met here and there particularly in the province in which Canton is situated in the south and to the west of there, there is no reason to suppose that the land reform is not to all intents and purposes practically complete. This means, as the

Indians I talked with in New Delhi about this time last year told me, that every man has about a handkerchief of land. The amount of land per person is very small indeed, except for officers in the army who are permitted to hold more land and certain officials who strangely enough are also permitted to hold larger areas of land. This land reform, so called, or the completion of it actually means that the Chinese gentry, particularly the landed gentry, have been robbed of their power and influence and that the Communist Party agents in the villages in the name of the peasantry are running the show. The government has destroyed, in other words,--have gone a long way towards destroying--one of the oldest classes in China, the gentry who have produced the painting, the art, the literature, poetry, politics, the officials and consumed the best cooking in China.

The next task was to take over the cities. There has been a great deal of controversy as to the role that Mao Tse-tung has played in Soviet theory and some people have felt that the great contribution he has made was that he understood the role of the peasantry and added to that great body of doctrine the new concept that the peasants were important in revolution and could be the leaders of revolution. This is not quite so. Anyone who has read Lenin, particularly his two treatises, will know that

Lenin was thoroughly well aware of the role of peasants in revolution. That Mao added was not so much the idea that peasants are important as his own genius in organizing peasants in understanding their potential fury and pent up social energy and also his deep understanding—a good deal of it acquired, I think, through the Chinese novels like All Ten Are Brothers—of the way in which movements in the countryside can be organized and the importance of holding up in a given strategic area with military forces.

The movement back to the cities meant the movement back to a situation in which principle and interest could be combined. That is, in which the principles of the proletariat was the leading party in the revolution could now be restored and the interest in industrialization and strengthening and broadening the social basis of the revolution could be pursued.

The movement to the cities, though, had its dangers. These men had been living in the country for a long time. People who were in Shanghai who were in the communist told amusing stories about the way in which the communist soldiers behaved when they came to this modern Babylon, how they understood little about the modern conveniences of the great city and so on. The stories have that same amusing ring about them that the old pre-war

stories had about the Japanese ships which were all loaded with concrete and fell over in the high wind--they're not really very funny. The communists were actually taking over Shanghai and the fact that some of their men had never seen running water before was not really very significant. They had seen running blood.

Now, the movement to the cities, though, had its dangers to the party elite. Cities are attracting. The Kuomintang knew that because it could hardly force its returned students from America out of the cities and away from double plumbing. The communists had the advantage in that they were thrown out of the cities and had to live in the villages. It had its dangers--what Mao Tse-tung calls the dangers of bourgeois ideology, in his phraseology--the fear that these men would fall for the temptations of the city and even take over some of the attitudes of the bourgeoisie. Because the businessman in the city is usually considered a fairly important person--not as much in China as in America but, to some degree, an important person. The movement back to the cities, therefore, was combined with a movement to build up the proletariat, so-called, and to bring down the social and political prestige of what Mao calls the bourgeoisie. This has been done

is a movement which is complex, whose objectives are undoubtedly more complex than this movement, called the San Fan Wu Fan Movement--the Three Anti and the Five Anti Movement. Now this movement had as its major objectives the purification of bribery, of avoidance of taxes, of all sorts of corruption and so on and so forth. It was first directed towards the party itself but then moved on with Five Anti Movement into a movement which was directed against businessmen. An Indian journalist who has just written a book called, A Report On Mao's China, tells of how, walking along the street, he looked into a shop and he saw a shopkeeper cowering behind his counter with two or three men talking to him in rather high voices and this very soon became a riot and the man was taken out and beaten and finally disposed of. The peoples' courts, which do this--there is no codification of law in Communist China--are carrying out general instructions which go down through the party organization to wrench every last penny they can out of any businessman who has any money. The communists are achieving several objectives at the same time. They are terrorizing the business elements; they are forcing them to scrape the bottom of the barrel--they get people so terrified they go and dig up that last stocking they had

buried in the ancestral home; they are giving face to the proletariat and a new consciousness, which is very necessary from their point of view, a class consciousness to the proletariat; they are changing the roles in the town just as they have in the villages. One by-product of this of course has been that they have lost the support of overseas Chinese. If any one factor had done anything to turn the overseas Chinese in Manila, in Singapore against Peking it is the fact that many of their friends, their cousins, their relatives have jumped out of windows to kill themselves under this pressure. It is important to leave the body. If you are a businessman in Tientsin or Shanghai and you can't take it any more, if you are going to be considerate, you don't jump into a river because your body will never be found and the assumption will be that you have fled to Formosa in which case your family will be punished. If you are considerate you jump out of a five story window so that a certain amount of evidence will remain.

It was important also to control another very important section of the population and that is the intellectuals. And together with these movements--the completion of the movements in the villages and the movements

into the towns--there has gone a movement which is popularly called "brain washing." This is directed against those intellectuals who are still in high position when the government, for one reason or another, still needs--men whom it is not necessary to liquidate physically. These men are very often scientists, of course, because the communists were not rich in scientists. Many of them were presidents of universities. This had to be done as part of the anti-American campaign because this was a very neat way of discrediting the social science and the humanistic tradition and the political institutions of the western world. So, important men--many of whom I know and my colleagues know--particularly in Peking where the movement began were taken back to school. Some of them were asked to write their confessions and, in one famous case, the first confession wasn't good enough so this man, who is a relative to one of the great modern Chinese, had to write another confession. Men who have been on this campus in the university here have written confessions. Dr. Hu Shih's son--Hu Shih, as you know, is the former Chinese Ambassador to the United States and often turns up in Seattle--his son wrote a confession denouncing his father, a very moving document. If I had time I would it to you. But this

brain washing then has gone on in two levels. First they have compelled important men to denounce their American background, Hsi Hsiang-shung is a very obvious example and whom I have known fairly well over the time and had assumed to be very pro-democratic sort of person. He has come out with a confession saying that everything he learned in America was nonsense and that he's only just woken up to the true facts of life. This deliberate humiliation of the intellectuals has not gone quite so easily as many people have supposed. I heard Mr. Hu Shih give a paper on this subject in Cleveland a few months ago and he satisfied me with his documentation that the communists have had a very rough time with the Chinese intellectuals and that the resistance they have put up to this sort of pressure is something that the Chinese can be very proud of indeed.

On the other level, the lower level, brain washing is serious business indeed. Men and women, those who are going into the party to work for the party, are organized in schools. But they tend to use the mass organizations that they have developed—and there is a mass organization for practically everything from brushing your teeth to fighting the Americans—and the aim is that everyone shall ultimately be in a mass organization; they tend to use labor unions, schools and so on and so forth and break people up into

small groups, sometimes as small as twelve people, with one well-indoctrinated leader in them to discuss the Leninism-Stalinism-Maoism and so on. And if you think, well, it is possible for the cycle to get by and to mouth the ready platitudes of this sterile dogma and still keep the freedom of his soul," I warn you against it. They know too much about human psychology to let you get away with that. After day after day after day of this sort of stuff in which you are not allowed, as Dr. Hu Shih said, "the freedom of silence," you are compelled to talk in which you are compelled to speak in terms which are acceptable ultimately to your listeners—and of whom is always a member of the party and in which you are compelled to write a diary saying, "Dear Diary," every day, "how I hate the Americans, how we must pursue the Korean conflict, how we must fight for the Five Anti and the Three Anti Movement," and so on and so forth, when you've gone through all that business if you have any mind left you are a stronger man than I am. Some of you have probably read John Hayes' report. I know John Hayes and he's as tough an American as I've ever come across and he tells in his report his life in a communist—with the amount of thought control that he was exposed to, he tells of the effect it had on him. Do

not underestimate it; it is very important indeed.

This enormous movement--and it is enormous when you've got 450 million people to look after--is one of the most fantastic accomplishments that any regime has ever carried out and they are getting along apparently quite well with it. This has gone along with the reform of the party. The Chinese Communist Party is in a constant state of purging, repurging, reform, re-education and so on. The purging by the Chinese is not as brutal, as open, as cruel as that by the Soviet Union but it exists still the same.

Now, how does the formal structure of Chinese government look. I have said something now to try to indicate the functional side of the picture as to how the government actually consolidated its power and how it actually runs the show. It has consolidated its power by destroying all potential opposition, by changing the relationship between classes, by taking a very long step towards what Mao Tse-tung called the classless society; and his idea of a classless society is exactly the same as that of the Kremlin's--a society in which there shall be those who rule and those who are the ruled. He has gone a long way towards leveling out the social landscape so that the difference becomes very obvious. The people are controlled;

the government is controlled through a party; the party is controlled from the top. The theory of control is called democratic centralism which belongs to that famous jumble of language that George Orwell described so well in 1984. This democratic centralism is of course a pleasant name for authoritarian control with the seeming trappings of democracy. The control of the party leads to the control of mass organizations and of all governmental institutions. But bear this in mind, because Communist China is a wonderful example of this. Propaganda to them is not what propaganda means to you. To you it is a nasty word and an art, a form of witchcraft concocted by remnants of New Deal bureaucrats in New York. The propaganda to the communists is organization, organization of a highly disciplined party which has added to it what they call the non-party activists, that is, large numbers of young men and women who are not members of the party but are in a probationary sort of state or not even going to be considered for the party but people who work for it under various forms of compulsion and persuasion and the mass of organizations through which they operate. This is the real functional side of the government. It is run by the party. But China is a big country. China is divided now into six administrative

districts. They are run by five generals and one civilian. The only civilian in charge of one of these districts is Mao Kung who is in charge of Manchuria and he is the sort of civilian who is usually thought of as being tough enough to aspire to the throne itself.

Now, the army is of course central to control and Mao is flanked with Chu Te, to whom he is extremely close and who has the loyalty of the army or at least shares it with Mao. This general structure of government is—obviously there is no time for me to go into it now and it won't help you very much because I've given you the functional side. But when you do look at a structural chart of the communist government, remember that it works because the party controls it.

I want to move on now to the economy. What have they done in the economy? They have completed the land reform which means that they have reduced private ownership of the land to a very small amount and to a large number of people. Now, obviously, this is only a stage in the game and the next one is to get collectivized farms and collective agriculture. They have a very tough problem here indeed but they are going about it with a certain amount of cunning. Some farms, model farms, pilot experimental

farms have been set up in Manchuria and it looks as if the movement has really begun up there. They start, not by talking about collective farms, they start with an old Chinese village habit which is mutual aid teams and they discourage these mutual aid teams, that is, you loan your farming implements to other people or you work together on a given project or somebody is given harvest and so on and so forth. Working through these into the next stage and the next stage until the final stage will be achieved by social pressures, economic pressures, economic pressures, political pressures and so on. The final stage will be collectivized farms. Now it is possible that they may not be able to achieve state ownership of all the land in any form or manner. They may very well find it prudent to leave the nominal ownership of the land in the hand of the peasant and still get their collective farms. Have they increased production? They claim to have increased the production of rice by 16 per cent, but their figures compare with 1949 not with 1937 and that is not usually ascribed. 1949 was the year of conquest, of civil war and complete dislocation. They have actually exported rice. We do not whether they have taken it out of the mouths of their own people--they're perfectly capable of doing so, the Russians did it. We do know that they have exported rice.

An Indian economist in New Delhi told me that he thought they had increased production to some extent and that this was possible because of the short range but immediate added incentive to production when men were given their own land, and there was elimination of the old taxation system. Now, of course, the taxes are actually higher than they were before. That is a very general statement but I haven't got time to qualify it at the present moment. But, by and large, the taxation is heavier than it has ever been before, not necessarily directly but indirectly through all sources of other means.

What about industry? The whole tendency now is to industrialize, industrialize and industrialize and for this they rely almost exclusively, but not entirely, upon the Soviet bloc. The industrialization seems to be moving away from the coast and more towards the interior. There seems to be a de-emphasis of the coastal cities, Yangtze River in Shanghai is no longer dredged, a de-emphasis of the coastal cities and a movement towards the interior and necessarily towards Manchuria which, of course, is industrially the most important part—potentially—of China. I cannot tell you what measure of success the communists have had in this to date. It cannot

be very alarming; the time hasn't been very great and they've been occupied with other things. But they have plunged with historical zeal into one area in which the Chinese have always been very good and that is public works. The communists boasted about the fact that they have one million laborers working on the Hwai River which is there between the Yangtze and the Yellow River, a very important drainage, irrigation and flood control project and I was rather amazed at in India I asked five Indians who'd been separately and individually to Communist China what had impressed them most and this thing had impressed them the most. Why? Because the Chinese said to them, "this we are doing with our own hands, with our own tools, with our own earth. This is ours, nobody else's, no Russian advisors or anything." But I notice that Mao Tse-tung goes out of his way in one statement to say that the Hwai River Project would be impossible without the cooperation of our Russian brothers. Now the public works, of course, extend also to other areas.

What about the pattern of trade? On this the communists have done an extraordinary job. In 1950 imports from the Soviet Union formed—I'm going to give you round figures—20 per cent of the total imports, that is imports

from the Soviet Union and the so-called 'People's Democracies' formed about 20 per cent, and imports from the capitalist countries 80 per cent. In 1951, imports from the Soviet Union were 44 per cent—nearly 45 per cent—and the People's Democracies 25 per cent, so it's 45 plus 25 that's 70 per cent while imports from the capitalist countries decreased to 30 per cent. This movement has gone on until today the imports from what they call the capitalist countries are 23 per cent. This complete reversal in trade has meant that the Russians are now dripping an awful lot of Chinese black tea and are — but that the Chinese have done a terrific job on transportation. And that is why it is no accident that is why it is no accident that most people who have been to Communist China say that one thing they have done well is transportation. They've got the whole movement of trains now from the tea coming from way down in South China and the tungsten and the antimony and all these things going in the other direction, not always by land because Polish and Czech ships now come to Chinese ports. They have completely changed the whole balance of trade in favor of the Soviet orbit.

On their foreign relations I think the story is fairly clear. Mao Tse-tung said in no uncertain terms in his famous phrase that he would lead to one side.

This he has done to such an extent that he is actually in the arms of Stalin for quite a long period. This leaning to one side to a man like Mao to whom the world is black and white—not like Nehru to whom it has very many shades of gray—in his view he belongs to the progressive, democratic orbit of the world, he belongs to the part of the world that is going to win. He believes that. He's quite correct when he says that he could not have come to power without the Soviet Union. I'm not saying gratitude as a motive, far from it. He's quite correct in saying that the Soviet Union helped him to power and he's quite correct in assuming that the Soviet Union has an interest in maintaining him in power.

What does he get out of his alliance? With his alliance—the Peking Moscow alliance—he gets from the Russians the military assistance, the technical assistance, the political and diplomatic support and to restore Chinese military prestige and political leadership in Asia. What do the Russians get? They get an aggressive ally who is willing to do for them something they're most anxious to see accomplished, and that is to deny us access to as large a part of Asia as possible. A very sound alliance. Chiang Kai-shek could have had the same alliance if he had wished—it was

offered to him.

The Korean War has probably had an enormous impact upon the relations between Peking and Moscow. Mao has secured from the Korean War a brand new army with brand new weapons, with brand new training in all the latest tricks and devices. By putting himself in a position where he had to fight a modern, the Russian advisers had to train him how to fight a modern army so he is well ahead of the game. Compared with his army of three years ago, his army today is a magnificent fighting force. He is the only member of the Soviet orbit who could get the Kremlin into a third world war. All the others are under far too rigid control, but he could get the Soviet Union into a third world war very easily, without any particular trouble. This gives him bargaining power in the Soviet bloc, and may have something to do with why the Kremlin would like to have a truce at the present time. I see Communist China as an ally more than a satellite of the Soviet Union, but I see no possibility of Titoism in Peking. The Russians have had one Tito and they're going to be very careful not to have another. They have means of putting pressure on Mao which are immediate and could be decisive. The situation bears very few similarities to the Tito situation. How then do

we estimate the strength, brittleness, of this regime? To my way of thinking, the Chinese Communists will never be overthrown from the inside, in any period of time that would interest us. They have eliminated all potential leadership against them; they have set up methods of social control which are effective and have proved work; from the domestic point of view they have their problems. They are hated, they are hated by the peasantry, they are hated by the businessmen, they're probably hated by the workers, they're certainly hated by most of the intellectuals; but what do they care, they're not in the business of being loved, they don't want to be. Why should they bother if they're hated so long as a lot of these people hate each other and so long as they have terror and other methods of controlling them. So the fact that these people have turned them and there is feeling against being is not decisive by itself. I think they are going to be an aggressive, military force which cannot stay at home. It cannot stay at home. By the way in which its power is devised, by the way it's set up, by the way in which it maintains itself in power, it must seek to expand. Even it, however, as a very brittle society, brittle in the sense that Stalin's Russia was brittle when Germany invaded Russia in the Second World War. That is, so long as the

outside shell is not broken into and cracked. If it's strong, it is tough, it is unshakable. But once the outside shell is cracked, just as when Hitler's armies marched into Russia and four million Russians surrendered, so if the shell of this type of society is ever cracked again--this society is cracked--I think you'll find that the inside, from the point of view of political allegiance, is rotten. And that the Chinese would welcome--any Chinese and just as many Russians--the opportunity to turn against this regime.

That relationship the Nationalist Government on Formosa plus the equal number of Chinese outside Formosa, there are about--no figures were in doubt this morning but let's say be generous and say ten million on Formosa and ten million outside in the Philippines, Malaya and elsewhere--let's say there are twenty million Free Chinese, that relationship these will bear to the development of political forces on the mainland depends on the Free Chinese. It depends upon the kind of political appeal that they will have. They have the greatest opportunity in the world now, but it depends upon what they have to offer. That is one of the questions which I shall raise tomorrow if you do not. Thank you very much.